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I. INTRODUCTION

Professor John H. Merryman in his comparative essay on
legal education in the United States and Western Europe,' in
particular Italy, asserts that:
The reader may have formed the impression by now that I
consider legal education in the United States to be superior to
that in most civil law universities. That is a correct impression;
ours is better. It is better because it has grander objectives;
because it draws on the full time and energies of teacher and
student; because it is concerned with human problems and
their solution; because it engages students directly in the study
and active discussion of such problems and of the process of
their solution within the legal order; because it displays a
higher opinion of the student and demands more of him; and
because its conception of the work of the professional lawyer-and accordingly of the mission of legal education to prepare persons for that profession-is a much richer, more
demanding and more realistic one.2
Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27 STAN. L. REV. 859
(1975).
2 Id. at 876-77.
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Having been exposed to two different legal traditions, as a student and law teacher in France and a graduate fellow and visiting
scholar in the United States, 3 I would respectfully like to consider
the statement in relation to my own legal experiences.
As Professor Merryman points out, the mission of legal education is to prepare persons for the legal profession. However, the
relationship between legal education and the legal system of a society is a complex one. The legal system imposes its values on its
educational subsystem and is at the same time reinforced by it.
What are the values which each legal system will further, and how
are they reproduced in legal institutions and legal thinking? Legal
education will in turn shape and maintain the basic features of the
legal system by trying to satisfy the demands which it expresses.
What are the goals assigned to legal education by each legal system?
How will they be enforced, and in what degree will they be realized?
This article will try to answer these questions in the following
way: First, I will attempt to conceptualize each legal system by reference to a procedural and a substantive model, to analyze the different paradigms on which each model is grounded, and to consider
their application in more precise areas of the law in France and the
United States. Second, I will examine how legal education responds
to the needs of the legal system in both countries by considering it
as a dynamic process, in which various participants acting in different arenas and through various procedures try to achieve certain
goals. Finally, I shall make an appraisal.
II.

UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS

The contrast between the American and the Continental European legal systems can be conceptualized by reference to two
models 4 that present distinctive features on a procedural as well
3 The author spent the 1981-82 academic year and the following summer at
Yale Law School.
4 The idea of taking two models has been inspired by two sources: first, by an

article published by Professor Mirjan Damagka, Structures of Authority and Comparative
Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975), in which the author used two procedural
models, a hierarchical model, adopted from Max Weber's bureaucratic model, and
a co-ordinate model, representing the patterns of authority characteristic of the
American system; second, by the classification of legal systems with respect to their
degree of rationality in decision-making, as set forth by Max Weber in his work.
For a good presentation of Weberian typologies, see Trubek, Wax Wieber on Law and
the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 720.
For an appraisal of the limits of the use of such models, because of the limitation of focus resulting from the choice of variables, see Abel, A Comparative Theory of
Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAw & Soc'v REV. 217 (1973).
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as on a substantive level. These models are based on the paradigm of the legal system, which will operate as a regulating ideal.
Obviously, some discrepancies will occur between the demands
of the model and the realities of the system. Both demands and
realities will express the needs of the legal system which shape
the patterns of legal education in a given country.

A. Procedural Model
1. The Paradigm: Values and Legal Philosophy
The main values furthered by the Continental system are
certainty and uniformity: "You ought to know the law before it is
applied to your case." Law should be applied equally, i.e., "in
the same way" to all persons in the same situation. The primary
goal of such a system is not to achieve justice in the particular
circumstances of each case but to make each decision fit into a
larger scheme which is deemed to be just. In case of conflict between the facts and the law, in other words when some specific
circumstances do not find their place within the general legal
landscape, individualized justice will be sacrificed for the sake of
this more abstract concept ofjustice, which one could describe as
a second-level goal.
In the American system, although certainty and uniformity
are important (because in a way they are the marks of the existence of the system itself) they are not primary objectives. The
main goal of this model is to reach the decision most appropriate
to the specific circumstances of each case, even if this operation
can involve some complexities and contradictions. The rationalist desire for simplification is eschewed as leading to artificial and
inequitable decisions. First-level justice is the regulating ideal.
The selection process of facts (which events will be deemed relevant by the legal system) will be conceived in a very broad fashion. This will affect abstract justice: specific treatment,
depending very much on individual decisionmakers, makes it
more difficult to avoid unequal treatment among members of the
same category of individuals.
In the Continental system, these values of certainty and uniformity can be achieved through a number of structural devices,
all grounded on the same principle, which we could call a principle of authority. This concept of authority is central in continental positivism, which still remains the most influential school of

748

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:744

jurisprudence on the continent. In Kelsen's view, 5 the basic
norm which he calls the "Grundnorm," merely establishes a certain authority, which may well in turn vest norm-creating power
in some other authorities. Inferior norms are not obtainable
from the basic norm by inference from the general to the particular (imputation concerns only superior norms), but have to be
created through acts of will by those individuals who are authorized by some higher norms to create norms. Thus, authority is
conferred by the normative order. The individual with authority
has the right to issue obligating commands. What is prescribed
by certain persons with certain procedures ought to be implemented, whatever the inherent qualities of their commands. Finally, authority is hierarchically organized in a pyramidal scheme.
Superior norms regulate the creation and execution of inferior
norms.
Kelsen's system is inherently coherent. However, Kelsen's
conception has been sharply criticized by the American Realists.
They view law much more as a process of decision than as a system of rules. The most refined modern theory of authority that
has been presented by this school is that of Professor Myres S.
McDougal. 6 In his view, law is a process of authoritative decision. But authority has here a completely different meaning. It is
not simply conferred by rules. Rules are only one of the factors
affecting decision, both its making and application. Authority has
to be sought "in the perspectives, the genuine expectations, of
the people who constitute a given community about the requirements for lawful decision in that community." 7 Finally, authority
in itself is not sufficient. A lawful decision needs also to be controlling, i.e., realized in fact and realized to a significant degree.
For McDougal's integrative legal realism, the legitimating function has its roots in the social process instead of emanating from
abstract concepts, as for instance, in a Kelsenian normative
order.
5 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 120-32 (A. Wedberg trans.
1945).
6 See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About InternationalLaw, Prologue to a ConfigurativeJurisprudence,in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 43-141 (M. McDougal & W.
Reisman eds. 1981).
7 Id. at 56.
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2. Application: The Organization of the Judiciary
a. Structural Features
Actual observation of the judiciary in Continental countries
allows us to identify three main attributes:
-a strong distinction between authority and the person exercising it;
-a precise delimitation of authority; and
-a hierarchical ordering of authority.
i. Distinction Between Authority and the Person Who
Exercises It
In the Continental system, the basic premise is that decisions
are not made by individuals, but by the institution itself. An
opinion is never signed by the individual who has written it. Judicial dissents are neither announced nor published. Actually the
decision process is completely hidden. When one analyzes any of
the very short and concise judgments of the French Cour de Cassation, one can observe that the court never seeks to justify its
decision on extralegal grounds; nor does it state the underlying
judicial policy. The court only states the abstract reason for the
judgment in the context of the legal system. That is to say, the
legal principle of law (not as stated by a particular individual, but
as interpreted by the court) that applies to certain relevant facts
permits the higher court to judge the particular decision of a
lower court. The reason most frequently given to explain these
characteristics is the desire to protect judges from outside interference and to enhance their authority.' Actually, if one analyzes
the issue in the context of a procedural model, one can explain
this absence of debate within the court opinion from two different perspectives:
-first, in regard to the decision currently made, if in an ideal
conception of the judicial function, the decision-making
process is conceived mainly as the application of norms,
there can be no room for discussion.
-second, in regard to future decisions, this current decision
will serve as a basis for decisions made by other decisionmakers who in the continental model are deemed to need
precise decision criteria.
In the American system, on the other hand, the court in itself is
not considered an institution. The judge is the institution.' When
8 See, e.g., 2 R. PERROT, DROITJUDICIAIRE PRiVE 642 (1981).

9 American Justices, including Brandeis, Holmes, Frankfurter, and Douglas,
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the bench issues a decision it need not speak with one voice. Judges
can deliver individual opinions. Very often, one cannot even determine the opinion of the court as such. In contrast to the continental
system, there is no artifact.' 0 Judges expose their viewpoints and
state their individual preferences. The decision process is disclosed
to the public. It is perhaps also less rigid and at first sight leads to a
better understanding of judicial decisions." But it also presents
some important disadvantages. It is a costly system in terms of
economy of thought: American decisions contain a lot of repetition
and sometimes contradictions, which would not occur in the Continental model. But more importantly, such a system cannot always
provide clear guidelines. In fact, within the context of our procedural model, such guidelines are perhaps neither required, nor even
desired.
ii. Delimitation of Authority
In the Continental system, the authority of courts is strictly
defined by legislation. Courts have no inherent power.' 2 The
Codes fix their substantive competence. Facts have been ordered
in categories that are defined by two criteria, subject matter and
economic value, whose co-ordination determines first a specialized decision-making channel and eventually a precise decisionmaker. In France the main division among these highly specialized jurisdictions is between the administrative and the ordinary
courts, which themselves can be divided on the first level into
civil, criminal, commercial, and labor courts. The interesting observation from our point of view is that as one progresses in the
hierarchy, the less important it is for specialization to be
grounded on facts (i.e., on subject matter and value). Facts are
digested by the system. At the top, authority is not founded on
factual criteria but on criteria which are furnished by the legal
system itself.' 3 The Cour de Cassation is competent for all subject matters. The specialization is only internal, and in the case
of a contradiction between divisions, the question is solved by a
have become famous for their opinions. Some courts have been personalized by
reference to the name of the Chief Justice who presided over them, for example,
the Taft Court, Warren Court, Burger Court, and so forth.
10 This statement has to be qualified. This absence of artifact can constitute by
itself an artifact.
I' See Goutal, CharacteristicsofJudicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S.A., 24 AM.
J. OF CoMp. L. 43 (1976).
12 See Dama~ka, supra note 4, at 516.
13 The Cour de Cassation is competent for all subject matters, but it only decides on the law, not on the facts. See infra note 29.
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super-division. The function of the Cour de Cassation is to provide for uniformity in decision-making. Such a conception can be
rationalized in various ways. But there is only one which goes
beyond the superficial level, namely, that it is grounded on the
belief that the unity of the law does exist and that the more abstract your reasoning, the more common principles you will be
able to discover.
In the United States, legislation concerning division of authority is very limited. There is no strict delimitation of authority
in time. The trial judge can, for instance, modify his or her decisions after publication.' 4 Nor does authority fit into a strict jurisdictional scheme. A litigant can, for instance, ask for a stay of
execution from either the court of original jurisdiction or from
the appellate court.1 5 Anticipatory categories have not been created. Specialized decision-making channels have not been made
available. However, as in the Continental model, one can find
some specialized decisionmakers in the American system. Federal statutes have instituted special courts for fiscal or excise matters, patents, and questions involving state liability. Numerous
administrative agencies have been attributed a special jurisdictional power. It is precisely in this area that the differences between these two systems are the most striking. These courts and
agencies are piecemeal creations-responses to very specific
problems. They are not organized into a whole scheme or system that preexists and anticipates every possible case. They are
not elements of specialized decision-making channels. Decisions
of these tribunals are subject to review by the Federal courts.
Some explain the "inevitable dispersion" of the American judiciary by appealing to geographical and historical factors. 6 But, it
is also linked to the substantive conception of law favored by the
American system. There was no need for co-ordination because
one could find no justification for it. Dissemination of authority
means that for the American system the belief in the existence of
one unique and complete body of law simply does not exist.
iii. Hierarchical Ordering of Authority
For the Continental model, authority is hierarchically ordered with regard to the importance of the question involved.
See Dama~ka, supra note 4, at 516.
Id.
See R. DAVID &J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR
417 (1978).
14

15
16

LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
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The ranking of the court will determine the number of judges
involved in deciding a case as well as their position within the
hierarchy. As Professor Damagka remarks, "A single judge will
be authorized to decide only minor offenses."' 7 More important
questions are decided by panels which at the level of the Cour de
Cassation are controlled by super-panels. The hierarchy of
courts is reinforced by the hierarchy ofjudges and supported by
the fact that the number of those deciding a case increases with
the importance of the court. All relations within the system are
superior-subordinate relations. The principal purpose of such an
ordering is to maintain the internal consistency of the system as a
whole. Appellate review is traditionally presented as a prerequisite for proper administration ofjustice in France, because it per18
mits reconsideration of the case by more experienced judges.
In the view of our procedural model, however, it is primarily a
mechanism that enables the system to achieve formidable uniformity in decision-making. In France, it thus effectively limits
the influence of lay people' 9 in the administration of justice by
submitting them to the control of professional judges who are
members of the hierarchy and who will apply its standards. Lay
participation is indeed completely excluded at the appellate level.
More generally, the lower judge, knowing the legal views held by
his superior, will usually follow them in order to avoid a reversal
of his decision. 0
In the American system, authority does not follow such a
strict hierarchical ordering. Even the most unimportant judge
can, for instance, strike down legislation as unconstitutional.
Although the reluctance to exercise judicial review in France can
be attributed to different reasons,2 ' the fact that jurisdiction over
questions of constitutionality has been vested in a special court,
situated at the top of the hierarchy, is in this regard a good illustration of the differences in conception. Furthermore, appellate
review in the sense of reconsidering a decision is not part of the
17 See Damaika, supra note 4, at 499.
18 See R. PERROT, supra note 8, at 701.

19 In France, lay people participate in the administration of justice in lower labour courts or in lower commercial courts because of their practical experience and
in order to realize a better acceptance of authority. They also form juries in criminal cases, but for the most serious offenses only.
20 See Damaika, supra note 4, at 496.
21 Historical reasons, going back to the French Revolution and to the reaction
against the pre-revolutionary courts which prevented the King from implementing
social reforms, can explain this actual reluctance to institute a real control on the
acts of the legislator.
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common law tradition.2 2 Not all appeals to the United States
Supreme Court, for instance, can be taken as of right, but instead
may require obtaining a writ of certiorari that states the reasons
for reviewing the case and grants permission for review. 23 Different reasons have been given to explain this situation. The development of appellate review would increase the number ofjudges
and lead to bureaucracy. 24 It would be impossible to achieve because of the importance of lay jury trials. More than 100,000
cases a year are decided by jury trial, and jurors neither give the
reason 25 for their decisions nor readily apply general and precise
guidelines to individual cases. 26 Actually this argument hides the
true reason, which is the tendency of the American system to refuse mediatized reality as well as the absence in this model of a
strong demand for uniformity.
Consideration of these structural features reveals that some
conditions which are absolutely vital to the Continental model
are not required by the American model. All these attributes are
means to fight centrifugal tendencies. They are not required by
the American system because it is a model which is basically
grounded on decentralized decision-making.
b. Dynamics
A dynamic perspective would provide answers to two different questions:
-first, how does the judge fulfill his task in each of the
models?
-second, what is the purpose of judicial decisions in each
system?
i. The Function of the Judge
In the Continental system, the ideal perception of the
22 See Dama~ka, supra note 4, at 514 ("[In England] whether in royal courts or
local ones, criminal cases involved one-level adjudication."); see also 4 C.J.S. Appeal
& Error § 18a ("The remedy or procedure by appeal is of civil-law origin, and was
• . . entirely unknown to the common law."); In re Abdu, 247 U.S. 27, 29 (1918)
(noting "broad distinction" between the right of access to some court and the necessity for express statutory grant of appellate power).
23 See 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1982).
24 Cf Burger, The Time is Nowfor the IntercircuitPanel, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 86; Q
& A with the Chief Justice, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1985, at 93 (interview with Chief Justice
Warren Burger).
25 The jury, which is often perceived as a means to realize democratic decisionmaking and to keep justice within the society, is also a legal subterfuge which hides
the reason for decision.
26 See Dama~ka, supra note 4, at 491.
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judge's role is the mechanical application of the law. As
Montesquieu put it, the judge should only be "la bouche de la loi,"
the mouthpiece of the law. 27 He or she should have no creative
input. The technique he or she uses is syllogistic: he or she
reads the law, states the relevant facts, and applies the law to the
facts. Just after the French Revolution, he or she could not even
interpret the law when the texts were obscure and instead had to
address the question to the legislator by way of a special procedure called refire ligislatif.28 Not only could the courts not legislate, but the opinions of higher courts were not binding on lower
29

But, one rapidly admitted that the judge could interpret the law and there has always been a lot of creative activity
courts.

involved in judicial interpretation. Actually the Code civil is not so
much a comprehensive set of rules as it is a list of general orientations using very broad concepts." Initially, interpretation was
conceived as being limited to the text of the Code. This was the
time of the Exegetic School whose leitmotif was tout le Code Civil,
mais rien que le Code Civil." Logical derivation and the use of very

precise intellectual tools, namely, reasoning by analogy (afortiori,
a pan', etc.) should permit the judge to discover the presumed
intention of the legislator within the limits of the text of the
Code. This method, although criticized, has never been completely rejected and is still used today, especially with respect to
recent enactments. Saleilles and G~ny were among the main critics of the Exegetic School. Saleilles was influenced by the German historicists, and one century after the Code had been
adopted, perceived a real need to adapt the old text to new realities. G~ny went much further. 32 He asserted that sometimes the
legislator really had no intention and that in that case the judge
should be free to complete the text of the law by using a scientific
27 This conception of the judge's authority was adopted by the French Revolution for historical and political reasons, as a reaction against the conservatism of
royal courts and against the conservatism of courts in general.
28 The rf6r Mle'gislatif was suppressed by statute in 1837.
29 A decision of the Cour de Cassation only states the law, and is still not binding on the lower Cour d'Appel which will render the final decision by applying the
law to the facts of the case. But, in the case where the Cour d'Appel does not
comply, parties can ask the Cour de Cassation to deliver a second opinion which
will be binding on the lower judge.
30 See, for example, appendix I, Article 2265 of the French Code civil. The concepts of "good title" and "bona fide" are not defined.
31 "The whole Civil Code and nothing but the Code." This maxim developed
through the writings of those teachings in the 19th century.
32

F.

(1899).

GkNY,

METHODE

D'INTERPRETATION
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method. The interpretation of rules now utilizes all these methods and remains one of the principal tasks of the Continental
jurist.
In the American system, the judge does not interpret rules.
He makes decisions. A decisionmaker starts from observation,
from the legitimate expectations of the people. He does not necessarily have to consider the sources of law, i.e., anticipated normative programs which exist prior to and therefore, to a large
extent, predetermine actual decisions. Although previous decisions are binding, the judge constantly creates law by distinguishing the cases on their facts. Facts are the source of law. 3 3 This
constitutes a fundamental difference between the two models.
The Continental approach to cases 34 states that they are simply
the illustration of a general principle. 5 Facts by themselves are
not important. The operative reasoning applies to the legal principles, not to the facts. When a Continental judge decides a case,
he or she does not only solve a controversy, he or she once more
applies the legal rule. Above all he or she has to consider the
"overall picture" in which the decision must take its place.
In the American system, on the other hand, the operative
reasoning applies to the facts. The great common law principle
is that like cases should be treated alike 6 The method is flexible: the judge has a choice with regard to the level of generality
and to the weight of precedent. The adaptation of the law is
easy. "By moving to treat cases alike on successively different
levels of generality, common law courts could slowly adjust the
law to fit new social policies." ' 37 In the United States, the judge
gives the answer when the problems are posed. It is a progressive process. An anticipatory response does not preexist. The
price of certainty in the Continental model is obviously a greater
degree of rigidity and a greater necessity to hide the use ofjudicial powers 3s in adapting the law to new circumstances.
33 Such a statement has to be qualified because it is a reduction of case law to a
Continental concept.
34 See, e.g., infra appendix I.
35 See Damaika, supra note 4, at 497.
36 For an interesting utilization of the principle in the United States with respect
to statutes, see G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 8-15
(1982).
37 Id. at 13.
38 The Continental system is still reluctant to recognize judicial decisions as a
source of law. See, e.g. ,J. GHESTIN & G.GOUBEAUX, TRAIT DE DROIT CIVIL-INTRODUCTION G NgRALE 328-62 (1977).
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ii. The Purpose of Adjudication
As I have stated, the main concern of Western European
judges is to make their decisions fit into the larger scheme. They
are much more concerned with the implications of their decisions
than with individual cases. Thus conflict resolution is not the primary goal in the Continental model of judicial adjudication.
Finding the truth,3 9 as defined by the criteria developed by the
legal system, is the principal goal. It is accepted that the solution
that a judge gives to a case is indeed the only one possible. The
American system is based on a different postulate. Consistency is
not the main concern of the American judge. 40 The purpose of
decision-making is justice as it appears in a given case. 4 ' He has
no transcendent preoccupation. Parties fight each other in order
to convince the decision-maker that their cause is just. They do
not try to help him apply the right rule.
Many procedural differences between these systems can only
be fully understood by referring to these different goals. The
idea of having a lawyer win a suit is typically American. In the
United States there even exist some devices which push the lawyer to fight more actively by interesting him financially in the outcome of the case, as exemplified by the contingent fee system. In
system is considered beneath the digContinental Europe, such a 42
There the ideal perception is that
nity of the legal profession.
lawsuits are decided on their merits and not in favor of the party
who has the best lawyer.4 3 This also explains that, while in
America the basic rule is that each party usually pays his or her
own attorney's fees, on the Continent, the loser may be required
to pay all fees. The underlying idea is that, in a way, the loser in
is guilty. He could only lose and he
the Continental system
44
it.
known
have
should
Under the American system of criminal procedure, lawyers
39 An example of the application of such a concept of truth is provided by the
French pourvoi en cassation dans 1'intret de la loi, which simply asks the court to declare
that the law was misinterpreted without changing the situation of the parties.
40 For the consequences of such a paradigm and the need for ordering the legal
system, see Vogel, Book Review, 58 IND. L.J. 286 (1982) (reviewing G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)).
41 See Dama.ka, supra note 4, at 483.
42 See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 342-52 (4th ed. 1980).
43 The ideal perception that is presented does not correspond at all with reality.
Lawyers, especially in civil matters where the provisions of the Code are open, can
have a considerable influence on judges' decisions.
44 The French proverb Nul nest cense ignorer la loi-nobody is supposed to ignore
the law--can be interpreted in this sense.
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will very often ask their clients to keep silent at the trial. The
Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California4 5 that one could not
infer any conclusion from such silence. In some European countries, on the other hand, the defendant's silence may serve as corroborating evidence of guilt. 4 6 This is one of the reasons why, as
Professor Dama~ka puts it, "almost all Continental defendants
' 47
choose to testify at the trial.
More generally, the judicial tactics which can or cannot be
used under both systems furnish a good illustration for our statement. In American civil procedure, a party who has conducted
discovery is ordinarily free to use or not to use the information
gathered. No such freedom of choice exists in Continental civil
law procedure, where you have to disclose all information to your
opponent. Moreover in classical criminal procedure, under the
American system, a defendant is not entitled to learn the substance of what the witnesses for the prosecution have to say. 48
He or she does not even know exactly who these witnesses will
be.4 9 This practice of trying to spring a surprise is completely
rejected in Europe, where full disclosure is requested in advance.
American judicial tactics can be understood only in the context of a judicial fight in which, before trying the case, the parties
do not really know the law that will apply to them.50 On the
other hand, in the Continental system, the parties know they will
set in motion a process designed to apply a predetermined normative program whose scope and limitations are sharply defined,
and whose content is both known in advance and unlikely to be
reshaped by their case. Indeed the parties will more often disa45 380 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
46 See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 42, at 453. This is also the rule in England,
where the judge is authorized to suggest to the jury that it draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to respond. Id. at 452.
47 See Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 527 (1973).
48 This is commonly referred to as the "sporting theory ofjustice." While still
firmly embedded in American jurisprudence, this theory has come under increasing
attack by commentators advocating increased use of discovery in criminal cases. See
Comment, A Proposalfor Discovery Depositionsfor Criminal Cases in Illinois, 16 J. MAR. L.
REV. 547 (1983).
49 This is the "majority rule." However, some state procedural systems allow
for the disclosure of the state's witnesses at the trial judge's discretion. See, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 48; Note, Discovery of State's Witnesses: State v. Walters, 43 LA.
L. REV. 1549 (1983).
50 This situation is perfectly illustrated by Hart's statement: "There are no easy
cases.
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gree over which "set" of norms is applicable, than over actual
substance of the normative program.
B. Substantive Model
1. The Paradigm: Values and Legal Philosophy
At a greater level of abstraction and in a complementary
fashion, autonomy and neutrality are the main values furthered
by the Continental model. More precisely, the Continental European legal systems are grounded on the explicit formulation of
these principles. They are the purpose of the system and serve as
regulating ideals. "The law of Western society traditionally is analyzed as an autonomous, logically consistent legal system in
which the various rules are derived from more abstract norms.'
This statement perfectly describes Kelsen's theory. Kelsen regards validity as derived from higher norms and ultimately from
the "Grundnorm." Derivations from the "Grundnorm" are
made from the general to the particular, from the superior norm
to the inferior norm. They are external to social reality and form
a complete abstract universe. Actually, abstract norms covering
all factual possibilities constitute a rational counterpart to reality.
Such an autonomous system is purportedly neutral par excellence. It is immune from the conflicts which are inherent to the
social process. In Europe, neutrality is considered as the necessary characteristic of a good legal system. It corresponds to the
Continental concept of justice, i.e., justice before the law in the
broad sense, not justice in the particular case. Kelsen goes so far
as to say that a legal norm may have any kind of content, and that
its validity cannot be questioned on the ground that its content is
incompatible with some moral or political value. Actually, Kelsen's normative system is completely independent from the social process. Policy is metajudicial. The only point of contact
between the social and the legal system is the "Grundnorm."
American realists completely reject the positivist conceptual
approach and theoretical framework. In their view, such a pure
theory of law is artificial and, in fact, constitutes a subterfuge.5 2
In Kelsen's view, if the law merely represented what is going on,
it would lose its normative character in reference to which "what
is going on" has to be judged. Thus, he advocates a body of
standards which are completely external to social reality. By doL. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 275 (1971).
52 See Morrison, Myres S. McDougal and Twentieth-CenturyJurisprudence:A Comparative Essay, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 3 (1976).
51
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ing so, he denies the complexities and multiplicity of legal
processes involved in a human society. The law of the state is not
the only law. Besides this myth system, there is an operational
code. Indeed, the law of a criminal gang can be more effective
than the law of the state. Furthermore, as it has been definitely
demonstrated,
the legal systems form a hierarchy reflecting the degrees of
inclusiveness of the corresponding subgroups, the total of the
legal systems of subgroups of the same type and inclusiveness
• . . [constituting] . . . a legal level. As there are inevitable

differences between the laws of different legal levels, and because an individual, whether a member of an advanced or a
primitive society, is simultaneously a member of several subgroups of different inclusiveness, he is subject to all the different legal systems of the subgroups of which he is a member.5"
In a system in which law is said to be grounded in the social
process, questions regarding the policy content of a given regulation, the degree of its effectiveness, and the factors and context of
choice, become fundamental and are no longer considered outside
the scope of legal inquiry. Consideration of interests or claims replaces logical derivations. Rules are downgraded to the rank of factors of decision and are much more respected because they
correspond to the subjective expectation of people rather than because of their alleged normative content.
2. Application: Property Law
a. Structural Features
The French Code civil defines ownership as an absolute right.
The owner is a sovereign. Legal ownership remains exclusive,
single, and indivisible. Only one person can own the same thing
at the same time.5 4 There is no intermediate possibility between
ownership and nonownership. Everything is owned by somebody. The Code cares for all situations. The legal landscape is
completed. Accordingly the Code civil provides:
Article 544. Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of
things in the most absolute manner, provided
that use is not made of them in a manner prohibited by law or regulations.
53

Pospisil, Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies, J. OF CON-

FLICT RESOLUTIONS,
54 Co-ownership

Mar. 1967, at 9.

does exist, but in this situation each co-owner owns a share in
the res, but not a determinate part of it. Ownership itself remains indivisible as an
absolute and liberal concept.
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Article 545. No one can be forced to yield his ownership, unless for public purposes and with prior, just
compensation.
Article 546. Ownership of a thing, either movable or immovable, gives a right to all which it produces and on
that which unites with it accessorily, either naturally or artificially. Such right is called right of
accession.
Article 539. All property unclaimed and without a master,
and that of persons who die without heirs, or
whose successions are abandoned, belong to the
public domain.
Ownership in the Continental model is a legal concept which
exists by itself. It has a precise legal structure and a definite place
among legal categories. Ownership is a real right (droit riel). Real
rights, as opposed to personal rights (droits personnels), are rights
which you may exercise directly on things, instead of persons. This
categorization implies a number of legal consequences. For instance, because real rights are absolute rights, you can enforce them
against anybody-this means that everybody has to respect them.
All real rights are listed in the Code and every situation is covered,
i.e., all other rights are personal rights. Ownership, as derived from
Roman law dominium, is composed of three elements: jus utendi,
fruendi, abutendi.5 5 Thus, lesser rights can be manipulated, but the
range of operation is predetermined. For instance, if you subtract
one element, you obtain a different concept: if you add usus and
fructus, you obtain another real right, a right of usufruct.56 Finally,
the concept of ownership exists by itself, independent of the different elements which constitute it. The distribution of lesser rights
among different persons will not affect ownership itself. There will
always be one identifiable person who will be the owner. In the case
of usufruct, for instance, the owner will be the person entitled to
abusus.
American jurists have pointed out that Continental ownership
could be thought of as a box containing certain rights.5 7 Whoever
has the box is the owner, even if the box is empty. They have criti55

See W.

BUCKLAND,

A

TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN

188 (1921).
56 Usufruct is defined as "the right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is
vested in another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and advantage

which it may produce, provided it be without altering the substance of the thing."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (5th ed. 1979).
57 Merryman, Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson), 48 TUL. L.
REV. 916, 927 (1974).
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cized the Continental conception because of its rigidity and artificiality. But, the independent existence of concepts corresponds to
the idea that the whole legal system preexists. It is also necessary
for a flexible operation of logical derivations; thus, the lesser rights
which compose property and which have been divided among different persons for some period of time can come back into the box
before being used in other combinations. In the American system,
such a concept of property does not even exist. There is no box.
There are merely various sets of legal interests. You do not own
something. You own a right in something, and different persons
can own different rights in the same thing at the same time. Abstract concepts are replaced by effective powers. This is the conversion formula5 8 which explains why comparing similar legal
institutions of both systems is so difficult.
Usufruct, for instance, is similar to a life estate. The owner who
grants an interest to another person has an interest which is very
much like reversion. But the reversioner in the American system
can never be considered an owner. He owns an estate, a future interest, while the life tenant owns a present interest. For the same
reasons the institution of trust is completely unknown in the Continental system. In the simplest scheme, three different interests are
created: that of the trustee, that of the beneficiary, and that of the
person who will, on termination of the trust, become a kind of
owner. Actually, one would find some similarity between the trust
and our concept of ownership which can also be divided among different persons. However, in the case of the trust, nobody really
owns the thing. Furthermore, the trust is not a legal concept in the
Continental sense of the word. The parts do not add to the whole.
As Professor Merryman remarks, the corpus cannot be wasted or
invested in speculative ventures even with the consent of all parties.5 9 Furthermore, the corpus is immune from the general creditors of both trustee and beneficiary. "Thus, when property is placed
in trust, there may be not only a division, but also a contraction, of
ownership."6°More generally, the absence of mediatization through
legal concepts multiplies the opportunities for building up legal
combinations which would be impossible to realize under Continental law.
58 This conversion formula is not entirely neutral, and does not give an objective
representation of the reality. Here it consists of presenting an American legal instrument in Continental terms.
-9 See Merryman, supra note 51, at 941.
60 Id. at 941 n.65.
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b. Dynamics
The purpose here in using two decisions-one of the French
Cour de Cassation and one of the United States Supreme
Court-is to show how the courts use different techniques when
they solve a real case. However, such a comparison is not fair
because judicial decisions do not have the same legal function in
each of these systems. In order to make a useful comparative
evaluation, they have to be placed in their contexts. With respect
to the French decision, this is a relatively easy task to perform. It
is enough to state which rule of the Code civil is applicable. The
same operation is impossible to realize in the case of an American decision whose context is constituted by other relevant decisions. This points out another difference between the systems.
In the Continental model, substantive decision-making could be
represented by a series of concentric circles containing the specific decisions, whereas in the American model it could be much
better represented by clusters of lines on which decisions take
place.
i. Decision of the French Cour de Cassation
The decision of Rebeyre c/Maire D'Ussel6 ' interprets Article
2265 of the Code Civil, which reads:
He who acquires real property in good faith and by a proper
title obtains ownership of it by prescription in ten years if the
true owner lives in the jurisdiction of the Cour d' Appel within
whose perimeter the property is situated, and in twenty years
62
if he is domiciled outside of the said jurisdiction.
In order to reduce the ordinary term of prescription from thirty
years to twenty or ten years, you need to satisfy two cumulative requirements: you have to act bona fide and possess a proper title.
But the Code civil does not define the content of these two concepts.
Thus the Cour de Cassation has in a series of decisions defined their
meaning under the cover of interpretation. In the view of the Cour
de Cassation, a proper title needs to satisfy certain very precise conditions, only one of them being under consideration in our case.6"
In its decision, the Cour de Cassation declares that, as it follows
See infra, appendix I.
Note that this provision expresses a clear policy without stating it openly: the
person whose domicile is not too far away from the place where the property is
located is supposed to be in a better position to prevent a third party from exercising adverse possession.
63 French cases never deal with global concepts but with the particular elements
they are composed of.
61
62
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from the terms of Article 2265, the title which transfers the ownership of the real estate, acquired a non domino, constitutes, through
prescription, a proper title vis-a-vis the real owner. In other words,
a proper title is a title which could have transferred the ownership
had it been passed by the real owner. A contrario, this statement excludes all titles whose effect is only declaratory of rights which have
been previously transferred. Such is the case, under French law, of
a partition. Article 883 of the Code civil states indeed: "Each co-heir
is considered to have succeeded alone and immediately to all the
effects comprised in his lot.....64
The way of handling the issue is a good illustration of Continental legal reasoning. Through the operation of very precise definitions, the court achieves determinative results which seem
ineluctable. In the Continental paradigm, the specific situation of
the parties in the case is only one decisional factor, its influence on
the court's decision is less momentous than would be the case in the
United States.
ii. Decision of the United States Supreme Court
In Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,6 5 an American cigar
importer asked for reimbursement of mistaken payments made
to the intervenors of confiscated businesses in Cuba. The Cuban
government refused to repay the funds and interposed the "act
of state" doctrine. Under American law, "acts of states," for example, nationalizations, expropriations, and confiscations, are
usually not subject to review by the judiciary.
In the context of what line of decisions does the Dunhill case
take place? The act of state doctrine originated in 1897 in Underhill v. Hernandez,6 6 a case where the United States was unwilling
to grant recognition to a government (entitling a claim to sovereign immunity) that might fall in short time, but where, on the
other hand, the United States did not want suits brought against
a potential foreign sovereign. A highly simplified exposition of
the recent state of the law in this area can be made by referring
briefly to the position of the Supreme Court in two cases: First,
the decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,6 v an exception
to the Bernstein doctrine, affirmed in 194768 and 1949,69 which
64
65

C. civ. art. 883.
425 U.S. 682 (1976).

66 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
67 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
68 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1947).
69 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Stoomuaart-Maatschappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
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stated that the courts could not intervene in matters with a foreign component unless the executive branch asked them to do
so. In Sabbatino, the Court actually declared that even if the executive branch asked for intervention, it would refuse to intervene,
because such a decision could create subsequent embarrassment.
Second, in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,7" the
majority opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist affirmed that the
courts should wait for a signal from the executive branch before
exercising jurisdiction. The dissent, on the other hand, although
admitting that courts had to show deference to the executive department in these matters, insisted on the independence of the
judiciary.7 '
Thereafter, the Dunhill decision actually attempted to limit
the act of state doctrine by, for instance, distinguishing between
commercial and noncommercial matters. 72 But on this issue it
received only plurality support. The point is that in order to perceive what the act of state doctrine really is and what it will be in
the future, one has to look at all these cases. The law is disseminated along different lines which intersect with each other. Actually, one case which is still part of an old line can already contain
or indicate new orientations, especially through the statement of
minority opinions. Linear decision-making incorporates a slowly
evolutive process.
The act of state doctrine as stated by the Supreme Court in
Dunhill is not a legal concept in the Continental sense of the
word. It is presented much more as a legal instrument created in
order to achieve certain results. This does not mean that in Europe law is not a "means to an end," as Von Ihering put it. What
one can say is that it is never presented that way, and that such a
conception does not correspond to our official perception of
what law is or should be. Technically, the Supreme Court does
not try to define the content of the doctrine, presumably because
it has no permanent structure. Once more, concepts do not exist
in American law. In this regard, what would have been the attitude of a French court in dealing with the act of state doctrine? A
French court would have enumerated the criteria of the act of
state, and the most important part of its decision would have
been defining those criteria. For a French jurist it is striking, for
U.S. 759 (1972).
71 Id. at 790-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 406
72

See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695.
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instance, that at no time does the Supreme Court really try to
analyze what a "commercial obligation" is or what "commercial
entities" could be. 7 3 In the American system, the definition of
terms is left to the discretion of each decisionmaker.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court sets forth in great
detail what one could call its "judicial policy," i.e., the reason for
its decision-it wants to avoid embarrassing the executive
branch-as well as the other factors which it takes into consideration: namely, increasing participation of states in international
trade, potential injury to private businessmen, adoption of the
same theory by courts of other countries, smaller risks of affronting foreign governments in the market place", etc. On all
these points, the Cour de Cassation would remain completely silent, not so much because it does not take them into consideration, but because they are not part of the official judicial decision
process.
Any discussions or dissenting views concerning a Cour de
Cassation decision will not be disclosed. All these considerations
make us understand why the Supreme Court can end its discussion by stating that one "label" 7 5 is not better than the other.
"Act of state" is a "label," perhaps a "doctrine," but certainly
not a legal concept in the European acceptance of the term.
C.

Conclusion

The differences between both systems can be characterized
in the following terms: the Continental model is centripetal7 6 in
terms of decision-making and structural in terms of legal thinking, whereas the American model is centrifugal 7 and functional.
At a higher level of abstraction, one can note that the contrast is
not in the different values furthered by both systems but in the
priorities they attribute to each of these values. All legal orders
present common features, precisely because they are "systems."
But, a legal system is not immune from the cultural context in
which it operates. Even if cultural differences between the
United States and Continental Europe are obvious and explain
different value hierarchies, there remains a common core of
73
74
75

Id.

Id. at 697-705.
Id. at 705. Compare id. at 725-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (act of state and
sovereign immunity doctrines fundamentally different) with id. at 705-06 n. 18 (same
conclusion reachable in both sovereign immunity and act of state contexts).
76 See Dama~ka, supra note 4, at 487.
77 Id. at 511.
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myths and beliefs, which are managed in different ways in the
framework of the particular system.
III.

LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Legal education is a dynamic process. Each legal system has
certain goals that various participants, acting in different arenas
and through various procedures, try to achieve.
A. Goals
The system of legal education is a subsystem of the legal order itself. The paradigmatic values promoted by the legal system
will also be furthered by the educational system, which will derive
its own goals from the demands expressed by the legal system.
Conversely, it will reinforce these demands and perpetuate them.
Apart from its function of social selection and classification,
which is one of the main functions of the educational system at
large, the official function of legal education is to nourish and to
supply the legal system. Basically, this is so even if, actually, most
of the students exposed to the system of legal education will not
operate within the legal system itself. What is involved here is a
"law of systemic consistency". The sub-system has to be consistent with the system within which it operates.
A systemic approach to legal education discloses that the
views expressed by some comparatists on the same topic may be
quite beside the point. In his article entitled Legal Education Here
and There: A Comparison,7 8 Professor Merryman of Stanford University writes that he considers legal education in the United
States to be superior to that of most civil law universities "because its conception of the work of the professional lawyer - and
accordingly of the mission of legal education to prepare persons
for that profession-is a much richer, more demanding and more
realistic one." 7 9 This is typically a value judgment, that is, ajudgment about the values which each system favors, not a judgment
about legal education. Thus, the objectives of legal education
are not the same everywhere. Different legal orders call for different lawyers. When lay administration ofjustice is important, it
is understandable that there will be lawyers whose minds will be
more open to human considerations. Maintaining consistency
implies that an American lawyer be trained to convince a jury. In
78
79

Merryman, supra note 1.
Id. at 877.
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the Continental system, on the other hand, law will be more technical, more immune from social and moral considerations.80 Education to inculcate these paradigms in the minds of lawyersand other people-in order to make the system work and to perpetuate it. In other words, if one wants to judge the effectiveness
of a given system of legal education, one has to compare the
objectives it espouses with the immediate results and long-term
outcomes it achieves, not with respect to the goals of one's own
system.
Since the purpose of each educational system is to maintain
conformity between individual behavior and the basic features of
the American or Continental model, the ideal output a given
legal system will be asking for will be that corresponding best to
the principles on which it is built. On the Continental side, the
proposed image will be that of a technical decisionmaker, specializing in operating abstract concepts and easily accepting superior
authority. On the American side, it will be that of a creative decisionmaker.8 ' Both representations are only images, because each
legal system preserves a certain degree of autonomy with respect
to social processes. Each legal system has its technicians, but
techniques are different. Convincing a jury is as technical as interpreting a legal rule. Giving many contradictory policy reasons
to justify the result is as hermetic as delivering a completely abstract and esoteric decision. Too much information can be as
detrimental as too little and acts as a subterfuge for the real
reasons.
It is true that both systems will favor two different creativity
processes. In the Continental model, individual creativity will be
constrained within certain limits. Principles of reasoning and
logic have to be respected. The sphere of legal reasoning will be
80 In the United States, in the case where evidence has been obtained illegally in
criminal matters, guilty persons have to be released where their convictions rest
upon that illegally gathered evidence. This is not the case in Continental Europe,
nor is it the case in England, where such evidence will be accepted, although the
offense constituted by the illegal gathering of evidence will be punished. This
stresses the autonomy of the American legal system: objective guilt is not equal to
judicial guilt. Furthermore, the justification of such a position is deeply rooted in
American ideology: man and woman is considered as good and innocent; the legal
system has to protect the individual against the state and its police; value considerations are introduced in official. processes. These values are not affirmed to the same
degree in Europe, and this is reflected in the procedural system. Law cannot be
separated from culture.
81 These creative decisionmakers have been described by many American authors through various images (social engineers or problem solvers), which seem to
reveal an evident bias of these authors in favor of their own system.
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strictly delimited. But one reaches on a smaller surface a higher
degree of abstraction. In the American model, such limits do not
exist or are very flexible. In other words, one cannot be wrong.
Individual creativity is less restricted and the frontiers of the law
are less precisely defined and more open to other fields of knowledge. Although this contradicts certain cliches, there is no less
creativity in one system than there is in the other. Both systems
are formed by, and pan passu form, the decisionmaker, but the
optimization of decision is conceived in different terms. The
making of a decision in the American system does not correspond to the same step in the Continental system. If one wants
the comparison to be fair, one has to take into account the Continental pre-decisional step, which consists in the pre-elaboration
of the legal principles. Less creativity in day-to-day application
can only be obtained because it has been preceded by a very intense creative phase. The comparison of the operations performed by final decisionmakers results in a false perception of
reality. Taking into account the greatest possible number of variables corresponds to two steps in Continental decision-making:
the rationalization of complexity and the application of the general principles so obtained.
A final misinterpretation, often encountered when dealing
with the goals of legal education, is the view that the objectives of
Continental legal systems could differ from the goals of forming
behavior or creating attitudes toward the law. Even on the Continent, where law is a kind of postulate, a primary goal is to achieve
social conformity to the legal order, public and private. It is an
oversimplification to oppose a lawyer who "thinks" with a lawyer
who "knows." It is not more essential for a Continental lawyer
than for an American lawyer to know "what the book contains."
What is important is to know that "the book exists." It is essential to see the "effort of memorizing," which is very often described as typical of the Continental system, in this context. This
educational technique has not been introduced because of this
supposed result, which in fact it rarely achieves. It has been developed in Continental legal education because it has been considered to be the best way to further the values and to respond to
the demands imposed by the legal system. Its purpose is to
transmit basic ways of reasoning and to obtain conformity to authority because these are the demands of the system. In the
American system, one uses different techniques (for example, the
case method) to achieve the same results, that is, to realize behavioral consistency.
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B. Participants
1. Law Teachers
Maintaining the unity of the law and the centripetal organization of its teaching are requirements posed by the Continental
model. In order to become a professor of law in France, for instance, you have to write a dissertation and obtain the title
Doctorat d' Etat - in order to take the Agrigation.8 2 The organization of this entrance examination is symptomatic of the Continental conception of law. The main division of law is
reproduced: there is an Agrigation in private law and one in public law. The Agregation is a national examination, that is to say,
law schools cannot hire their teachers directly. After having
passed the national examination, they are appointed by the government to each school. All law professors come from the same
source, have to pass the same exam, and are formed in the same
mold.
In the United States, the situation is quite different. Law
schools are very decentralized. Each law school hires its own
teachers through a series of less formal procedures, mainly based
on interviews with candidates. There exists a real job market as
exemplified by the annual Faculty Recruitment Conference in
Chicago and the Placement Bulletin of the Association of American Law Schools. As a result, the quality and focus of the faculties of the different law schools are very diverse and can be used
as a criterion to obtain a ranking of the schools. Such an operation would be much more difficult to undertake in France, except
perhaps for some Parisian universities, but for reasons which are
largely external to the working of the educational system itself.a3
American law schools look for specialists who can teach in certain
fields. Definition of competence is very factual and recalls delimitation of authority in the American judiciary. In France, the situation is different. Faculty members are considered capable of
teaching any subject within the scope of either public law, or private law, as applicable.
In France, a doctoral dissertation can take five years or more.
This dissertation is very important for the Agrggation itself, which
will partially cover the topic and the content of the thesis. This
82 The French Ministry of Education is presently trying to substitute another
kind of recruitment system to the Agrigation. But it has not vet announced its
intentions.
83 Centralization of education corresponds to the centralization of the whole societal structure in France.

770

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:744

doctoral dissertation is a good illustration of the Continental way
of thinking. Candidates will work during a very long time on very
narrow topics, chosen among concepts and categories. They will
produce highly abstract work. Professors have to be scholars,
and ability for research is a basic quality of the Continental
teacher. In the United States, on the other hand, very few professors hold a J.S.D,8 4 which in most cases is not even comparable
with a European dissertation. The ordinary curriculum allows
spending some time clerking with a judge or in practice, in order
to gain some practical experience before going into teaching. In
France, not only does the hiring system not require contact with
practice, but in a way discourages it from occurring, thus broadening the gap between practicing lawyers and professors. Professors will hold a prestigious degree which other lawyers usually
will not have because it is of no immediate use in practice. 85 This
feature has something to do with the authority which is accorded
to professors and with their tasks within the Continental
86
system.
In the Continental model, professors have a very important
function. They elaborate and maintain what one could call the
'
They order the system. It is, for instance, only
"legal science." 87
by applying a conversion formula that French law can be considered to contain areas of case law, in the American sense of the
word. This assertion is very often made in regard to the law of
torts, which is presented as a creation of the courts through a
very broad interpretation of Articles 1382 and 1384 of the Code
civil, or with respect to public law, which has been excluded from
codification and which is at present mainly the result of the jurisprudence du Conseil d' Etat.88 Actually, these areas of the law have
since their creation been completely organized by professors. If
one opens a book on administrative law, for instance, he or she
will find the same categories, concepts, and definitions as in civil
84 At Yale Law School, for example, only five faculty members of 67 held aJ.S.D.
degree in the 1981-82 academic year. [This has remained constant into 1985. eds.]
85 However, a doctorate can be useful to attract a clientele.
86 In Continental countries, the prestige of professors is higher than that of
judges. The situation is reversed in the United States with respect to the superior
courts. The importance of their function is perceived differently and accords to the
different needs of each system.
87 On Continental legal science, see M. CAPPELLETTI,J. MERRYMAN &J. PERILLO,
THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

170-75, 229-39 (1967).

The Conseil d'Etat is the highest administrative court in France. Administrative
courts have jurisdiction for "public-law disputes." See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note
42, at 462-83.
88
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law. The only reminiscence of case law is that the permissible
level of indetermination, which differs from one system to another but which is also absolutely necessary to its operation, remains greater in these areas than it normally does in the
Continental model.
In the United States, the task of scholars is different. There
is no legal science to preserve, and legal scholarship can be more
innovative. If one adds to this that a very strict categorization of
fields does not exist, one can conclude that, generally speaking,
scholars have more opportunities to carry out experiments. One
would never find courses entitled "Tragic Choices" or "Mass Disasters and their Procedural Idiosyncracies" in the curriculum of
a Continental law school.8" These characteristics can serve as an
explanation for the strong differences one observes in the internal administration of law schools. In the American system, the
greater independence of teachers in their work implies a need for
their strict coordination through the institution of a powerful
dean. In Europe, deans' powers are more symbolic. There is not
so much need for coordination because centripetal elements are
built into the system itself. Furthermore, one can link the appearance of so many independent institutes9 ° within the Contintental law schools to the emergence of new fields of law, for
example, European law, comparative law, and so forth, which do
not readily fit into one of the existing categories.
2. Students
The main difference between American and Continental law
schools is that the selection and classification processes do not
take place at the same stage. In America, the selection process
operates before one enters law school. The main factor for admission is academic excellence. It consists of the score obtained
on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and the grades received during the applicant's undergraduate university education. Selection is already combined with social classification.
The whole system is decentralized, that is, the best students will
go to the best law schools where they will also find the best teachers. At the law school, the classification function continues
89 These course titles were taken from the 1981-1982 Yale curriculum. See infra
appendix III. Perhaps the example furnished by the Yale curriculum does not give
a fair representation of the ordinary reality of American law schools. But the important fact is that such courses would never appear in the curriculum of any
French law school.
90 See Nerryman, supra note 1, at 869.
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through the attribution of grades or responsibilities (for example, service on the law journal) but the selection function is almost terminated. In France, on the other hand, there is no
selection before entering law school, which would have to be organized by the law school itself. The only requirement is the attainment of the Baccalauriat, which opens the way to all
Universities and which cannot be considered as a serious obstacle
anymore. 9 Furthermore, social classification does not operate at
that stage. All law schools reproducing the centripetal tendencies of the legal system will have the same admission requirements, that is to say, the Baccalauriat, without taking grades into
account, and thus admit the same categories of students. The
whole selection and classification process will take place during
the time spent by the student at the school, and will actually constitute a heavy burden for Continental law schools.
The student body has been affected quantitatively and qualitatively by this largely open Continental admission process. On
the one hand, it has led to the "mass university." Law schools
have been gradually inundated with students, without any possibility for the schools to adapt their resources adequately.9 2 Thus,
the management of selection (i.e., reducing numbers) became a
primary objective in French law schools. From a qualitative perspective, one should note that students in French law schools are
much younger and much less experienced than students in American law schools. In France, there are no pre-law college students. This affects students' attitudes toward the law. Professor
Merryman is indeed correct in pointing out that Continental law
schools are not exclusively devoted to preparing persons for the
legal professions.9 3 Furthermore, the social objectives of law
schools in the two legal orders actually reflect two different conceptions of what the field of law is or should be. Today, law in a
technical sense permeates all spheres of social life, and the ideally restrictive Continental perception does, perhaps, not really
fit with this reality. On the other hand, Continental law schools
find it more and more difficult to reproduce a paradigmatic ideal,
which, consequently, is more and more contested by some of the
participants in the process.
91 Of the students who take the Baccalaurgat, 60 to 70% pass it. However, some
universities try to take into account the grades obtained.
92 See Merryman, supra note 1, at 861 ("The Faculty of Law at the University of
Rome has 12,000 to 15,000 students, while the Stanford Law School has a student
body of 450.").
93 Merryman, supra note 1, at 861.
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C. Arenas
Professor Merryman observes that "universities in the civil
law world lean in the democratic direction, while meritocracy is
the dominant ideal in American universities." 94 Without discussing the merits of an opposition between meritocracy and democracy, which is in itself questionable, one has to recognize that this
is a non-contextual appreciation. With respect to social selection
and classification, one has to admit that economic and social barriers to university education have been largely suppressed-the
costs of legal education on the Continent are not comparable to
the fees one has to pay to American law schools.9 5 But, meritocracy remains the basic selective principle in all Western societies. What one can actually observe in France is that barriers
have not really been suppressed but have rather been moved to
other places. This phenomenon could be called a "systemic
shift." The Grandes Ecoles prepare graduates for high echelon
jobs both within and outside the legal world. The reason for
their success is, of course, that they reproduce pure, meritocratic
models with a highly selective admission process and permanent
evaluation. A good example of this phenomenon is that furnished by the "Ecole Nationale dAdministration,' 9 which leads to
the elite jobs throughout French society. This Grande Ecole now
has a virtual monopoly on all high-level positions in the area of
public law. The law school graduate seeking a high ranking civil
service job must be admitted to this school after graduation or
must satisfy himself or herself with a lower position. Finally, if
one takes into account the existence of these "meritocratic"
schools, it is not at all sure that the French legal educational system leans in the "democratic" direction in the sense in which
Professor Merryman uses that term.
Nor is it fair from a technical point of view to compare law
schools of American universities with those of Continental universities. This is true even in countries where "big schools" do
not exist. Universities in the Continental legal world form only a
small part of the legal educational system. For most legal professions it serves only as a preparatory step. This observation is an
answer to the reproach of "non-professionalism," which some
Id.
Tuition in a French law school is less than $100 a year.
,)6 The Ecole .Vationale d;Idministration is typically a French elite school. The top
students enter the Grands Corps, which means not only that they are appointed to
some high administrative position but also that they will possess a title which will
open doors at all levels of French society.
94

95
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address to Continental law schools when comparing them with
American law schools. It is true that in Europe there is very little
practical training organized within the law school itself, whereas
in America clinical training may be a requirement. These situations perfectly characterize the American and Continental paradigm. In Europe, law is "pure" and abstract; in the United States
it is instrumental.
But such a representation remains too simplistic to provide a
true picture of reality. It omits the fact that legal education in
Europe also takes place in other arenas. In other words, the assimilation between law schools and legal education does not
work on the Continent. In Europe, professional training is provided outside the university and after graduation. In France,
there is a special school for judges, which is also one of the
Grandes Ecoles-the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature;recently, special schools for lawyers have been organized. In addition, the
new lawyer will have to complete a two-year probationary period
during which he or she will attend practical and theoretical
courses. Once more, in order to make adequate comparison, one
has to adopt a contextual approach and look at the larger picture.
Such a perspective brings out the real differences between both
systems. These differences are relative. If one considers a paradigm as given, one can affirm that the differences essentially concern the localization of functions performed by a specific system,
but not the functions themselves.
Finally, if one focuses on the law schools themselves, one
can notice that in many ways their organization typically reproduces the basic features of the procedural models presented
above. American decentralization contrasts with Continental
centralization. The contrast is reinforced by the fact that on the
Continent, there are very few private universities, and no private
law schools. All the law schools are based in the universities. In
France, the whole university system, which is public, is directed
by the Ministry of Education. One of its main tasks is to establish
unified educational programs. During the four years reqiured to
earn the Mazirise, which is the basic law degree, students will attend the same basic courses once they have chosen their specialization. In the United States, on the other hand, each law school
organizes its own curriculum, and confers its own degrees. All
American law schools prepare candidates for the basic law degree-JurisDoctor-which takes three years, but the organization
of graduate programs differs from one university to another.
Maintaining the unity of the law is the main purpose of the Euro-
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pean organization. This goal is not part of the American paradigm, where there are so many different laws (for example, the
laws of the fifty states and Federal law) and the law is not assigned a very delimited field.
D. Procedures
Here I would like to examine procedures through which the
legal educational system will shape behaviors to conform with the
legal model. That is to say, I intend to show how the content as
well as the educational methods are employed in order to reach
this goal. Both the content of legal education as well as the educational methods developed by each system will perfectly correspond to the paradigmatic vision of the law which each system
maintains. In the Continental model, as we know, law is conceived as a complete body of norms which is structured in a logical order. Some authors9 7 describe these features by referring to
the existence of a "legal science" or a "grammar of the law." 98 In
the American model, on the other hand, such a grammar does
not exist. There are no generalized conceptual patterns, and the
field of law is not delimited and defined in a very precise fashion.
In regard to the content of legal education, an empirical
study comparing the curriculum of a French with that of an
American law school points up the different possibilities in the
choice of courses. In other words, the way this choice is managed
by each school directly reflects the differences in the organization
of legal minds, i.e., in the patterns of legal reasoning which both
models have developed. The French curriculum can be read in
the following way. One can distinguish the first two years which
lead to a "Diploma of General Studies"-Diplme d'Etudes Universitaires Ginerales.99

During the first year, and the first semester in particular,
courses are mainly introductory (i.e., dealing with questions common to whole areas of the law or describing the operation of enforcement institutions). Thus, students will be required to take
Constitutional Law, a general Introduction to Civil Law, Criminal
Law, Organization of the Judiciary, and so forth. One could describe these courses as "general part" courses, because they con97 See M. CAPPALLETrI, J. MERRYMAN

& J. PERILLO, supra note 87.
98 F. Von Savigny first used this image in his work, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR
AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1975) (reprint of 1831 ed.).
99 The curriculum discussed here is based on courses offered at the University of
Paris-II School of Law in 1980-81. Minor differences may occur from year to year
and from one university to another.
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cern issues that would be dealt with in the general part of a Code.
In terms of Continental legal reasoning, they correspond to the
factorizing process,' 0 0 which consists of extracting some common
principles and treating them independently in order to simplify
legal rules and to solve "equations" obtained by logical derivations. The other type of courses could be called "background"
courses, such as history, economics, political science, or international relations. Continental categorization exercises its influence on the way these non-legal courses are taught, that is,
without being integrated with the basic law courses.
During the second year, courses which are compulsory are
clearly presented as the next step in the student's curriculum.
New complementary categories will appear, for example, commercial law, and students will start to progress logically in the
fields they were introduced to during their first year. In civil law,
for instance, after having started with general principles in a
static perspective, students will have to apply these principles in a
relational context (to concrete factual situations, such as contracts and torts). Background courses also become more specialized and technical.
During the third year of studies leading to the degree of
Licenciate in Law, the topics of courses become more and more
specialized. In civil law, not only are students required to attend
a course in family law but they can also choose to study matrimonial systems and inheritance or successions. Finally, during the
last year leading to the Master of Laws-Matrise en Droit-the
main division of Continental law clearly appears.' 0 ' The law student must specialize in a given field of study, for instance, private
law or public law. The organization of the last year of studies
brings out the underlying principles which govern legal education in the Continental model. At the University of Paris II, for
example, three formulas are offered to students. Students who
have not yet attended the basic civil law courses are required to
do so. Students who only attended some of them are required to
take those they did not yet attend. Only those students who attended all the basic civil law courses are free to choose other
courses. Law is conceived as a systematic whole, and the content
of legal education is intended to be uniform for all the products
of the system. Required courses are numerous and choice is very
100 See Dama~ka, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1366 (1968).
101 See infra appendix II.
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limited. Even when it can be exercised, it will take place within
the pre-existing categories and the system will always have the
last say. All these characteristics recall the basic features of the
Continental creative process.
The curriculum offered by an American law school appears
quite different. At Yale, for instance, 102 apart from the requirement to take the four basic first-year courses during the first
term-Constitutional Law, Contracts, Procedure, and Torts; and,
in addition, Criminal Law, sometime before graduation-there is
practically no imposed order over time. ° 3 Where such an order
exists, it is grounded on the criterion of greater complexity. In a
given field a student may be required to take a basic course (for
example, Antitrust I) before the more advanced course treating
the same topic (for example, Antitrust II). But, the criterion will
not be one of greater specialization in terms of the scope of the
law, and in the cases where such a criterion could exist, specialization would never reach the degree it reaches in Continental law
schools. Basic courses are not conceived as "general part"
courses. Factorizing is not the American way of thinking about
law and general concepts are not available. A preexisting ordering of the field, dividing it over the whole time spent at the law
school, does not exist. The American curriculum looks like a
shopping list. Even when some groupings are suggested to students, as is the case at Yale, they remain very factual. Background courses such as Anthropology of Law, Economic Analysis
of Legal Problems, or Anglo-American Legal History are conceived in more functional terms than they are in a Continental
law school. They are actually applied to the legal field. Law is
not strictly separated from other disciplines. The topic of many
courses is at the intersection of legal and other technical areas
such as health law and policy, law and the visual arts, and so
forth. Legal studies are concerned with the social and political
process itself. There are courses about bureaucracy, law and the
political process, and so forth. Policy questions are not excluded
from the field of law, and strategies of decision-making are examined at micro-levels (in a course like Strategies of Public Management) as well as on a global scale (in a course on Public Order
of the World Community: A Contemporary International Law).
The American curriculum also provides for professional
training inside the law school, and offers many research opportu102
103

See supra note 89; see also irifra appendix III.
See infra appendix III.
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nities through the institution of research seminars and independent research. This constitutes quite a distinctive feature with
respect to the Continental model where the function of the law
school is defined more restrictively. In Europe professional
training is organized in other arenas. Research is reserved for
doctoral candidates and does not take place in the ordinary curriculum. Finally, one should stress the great flexibility of the
American curriculum which favors a real tendency for innovation. New courses are created every year, sometimes on very specific subjects, in order to take into account the interests and
research of particular teachers or the currency of some new legal
issue.
With regard to educational methods, one often opposes the
American so-called "Socratic method" and "case method," originally introduced by Professor Langdell °4 at Harvard, to the
more traditional European lectures. In the first method, which
presents many variants, students are required to participate in
class discussions and to study case materials before class. The
teacher plays more or less the role of an umpire, orienting discussions by asking or answering questions. On the Continent, on
the other hand, students are normally not expected to participate. The teacher communicates his "wisdom." Students listen
passively.' 0 5 These images correspond perfectly to the paradigms developed by both models on the procedural as well as on
the substantive level.
On a second level, one could try to characterize how these
images actually hide the operational functions of the educational
system. Indeed both systems have identical systemic needs, that
is to say, needs dictated by the structure and the function of the
system itself. Both need to be accepted by participants and both
need to communicate some knowledge. Acceptance of the system can be obtained by participation or by exercising unilateral
authority. In the past, the French system was mostly based on
unilateral authority. This feature has been attenuated since the
institution after 1968 of travaux dirigs, which are small tutorials
conducted by lecturers where the teaching method employed
looks very much like the case method in terms of participation
and preparation. On the other hand, the American system also
104 Langdell introduced the case method at Harvard in the 1870's. Strangely
enough, he justified this introduction in Continental terms: he intended to produce a general theory of law.
105 See Merryman, supra note 1, at 871.
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organizes a process of unilateral communication of knowledge.
Class discussions are perhaps more stimulating and facilitate the
discovery of the policy reasons which underlie decisions. But this
does not prevent the conveyance of information, even if this information is different from that communicated in a Continental
law school. I compared course notes of different years taken by
different students in the same class directed by the same teachers. They had almost the same content. From this peispective,
the fact that a teacher is perceived as an umpire appears as an
artifact intended to obtain a better acceptance of authority and to
provide for better communication, albeit unilateral, of
information.
In the American system, unilateral communication will principally result from the contextual conditioning to which the students are subjected. Very general (the values recognized in the
system, the dominant legal thinking, etc.) or specific (the point of
view of teachers, the choice of cases reproduced in the case book
or materials, etc.) factors will induce students to have opinions
taking similar directions and develop common attitudes to specific legal issues.

E. Conclusion
Once one admits that different legal educational systems
have to be judged in reference to the different values they further, the actual effectiveness of each of these systems can be measured by comparing the results they achieve with the objectives
they have.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The initial conclusion is methodological. An observer must
begin by defining his observational standpoint. He must be clear
about his own objectives and make appropiate allowance for the
preferences and biases inherent in his own culture. In other
words, it is unfair-and to a large extent irrelevant-to judge a
foreign educational system by reference to the values of one's
own legal system. The establishment of an observational standpoint is particularly important in the field of comparative studies
because one has to find a basis for conversion, a common denominator, in order to make one system understandable in terms
of another. Adopting an independent standpoint is the only way
to make the complexities of reality come out. The social system
is composed of a multitude of interacting dynamic processes. In
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each system, specific values are hierarchized; paradigms provide
a framework for action; and social images regulate behavior. The
observer is under an obligation to clearly delimit his focus of inquiry. This essay points out the importance of the role of paradigms in the operation0 6of law in society and the need for explicit
conversion formulas. 1
The second conclusion goes beyond methodological considerations. For the student of comparative law, an anthropological
or sociological approach should prove to be appropriate and productive. 10 7 Such an approach should allow the scholar to break
the shackles imposed by his own legal background and enable
him to identify equivalent legal functions as they have arisen in
the systems under observation. It is certainly worthwhile to establish conversion formulas and to describe one system in terms
of another. While the conversion method provides a basis for
description, it cannot be used to explain why, or how, a given
function is performed through different legal (or societal) instruments in two different legal systems (or societies). The scope of
law varies from one society to another; the only way in which we
may hope to grasp the inherent features of any legal system is to
examine it not only in its institutionalized form but also as the
product of social processes. This is true of each legal system; it
applies a fortiori to comparative law. Indeed, this method was
used by a distinguished eighteenth century French jurist who laid
the foundations for a modern theory of comparative law.' 0 8
106 On the opposition between myth system and operational code, see W. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES:

BRIBERY, CRUSADES,

AND REFORMS

15-36 (1979).

In his doctoral dissertation published in 1958, Kapauku PapuansAnd Their Law,
Professor Leopold Pospisil affirms, in line with Malinowski's genius, that every
functioning subgroup of a society has its own legal system which is necessarily different from those of other subgroups. See L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND
THEIR LAW (1958) (Yale University Publication in Anthropology No. 54); B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); see also L. POSPISIL, supra
note 53, at 9. See generallyJ. COMAROFF & S. ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES (1981)
(anthropological dimensions of the processual paradigm of law as contrasted with
the rule-centered paradigm).
108 MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DE LOIS (1748). See F. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY (1973). Professor Hayek distinguishes between a "spontaneous legal
an organization." Id. at 37. It is worth
order" and a "directed social order ....
noting that the copyright page in Professor Hayek's book bears a quotation from
Montequieu.
107
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June 16, 1965

Cassation

With regard to the first part of the first argument: Looking into
Article 2265 of the Code civil;
As it follows from the terms of its text, the title which transfers
the ownership of the immoveable property acquired "a non domino," constitutes, in regard to prescription, a good title vis-A-vis
the real owner;
having established that Rebeyre had acquired, by notarized title,
dated January 8, 1936, three plots of land from Dame veuve
Chevalier, who was only in possession of these plots, the Cour
d'appel delivered a judgment that did not recognize that the
buyer, who acquired bonafide, may exercise his right to prescription after the expiration of a period of ten years, on the ground
that his vicious title, passed by a non-owner, prevented him
"from invoking a ten year bonafide prescription instead of a thirty
year prescription as it is required by law";
in deciding so, the judgment of the Cour d'appel was at variance
with the text of Article 2265:
FOR THESE REASONS, and without taking any further
standing neither with regard to the second part of the first argument, nor with regard to the second or third argument:
THE COURT HAS DECIDED TO REVERSE the decision of the
Cour d'appel of Limoges dated December 16, 1963; accordingly, the
court puts the parties in the position they were before the said judgment and requires them to vindicate their rights before the Cour
d'appel of Poitiers.
Thirty Year Prescription
Art. 2262-All actions, real as well as personal, are prescribed by
thirty years, without the one who alleges such prescription being
obliged to show a legal title thereto or to oppose an exception of
bad faith being raised against him.
Prescription by Ten and Twenty Years
Art. 2265-He who acquires immovable property both in good
faith and by a proper title prescribes ownership of it in ten years
if the true owner lives in the jurisdiction of the Cour d'appel within
whose perimeters the property is situated, and in twenty years if
he is domiciled outside of the said jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX I (FRENCH)

16 juin 1965

Cassation

Sur le premier moyen pris en sa premiere branche:
Vu L'article 2265 du Code civil;
Attendu qu'aux termes de ce texte, l'acte transf&rant la
proprit6 d'un immeuble acquis a non domino constitue, au point
de vue de la prescription, un juste titre au regard du v6ritable
propri6taire;
Attendu qu'ayant constat6 que Rebeyre avait acquis, par acte
notari6 du 8 janvier 1936, trois parcelles de terre d'une dame
veuve Chevalier, qui n'en 6tait que d6tentrice pr6caire, l'arrt infirmatif attaqu6 a refus6 de reonnaitre que l'acqureur, dont ila
admis la bonne foi, 6tait en droit de se pr6valoir de la prescription abr6g6e de dix ans, aux motifs que le vice de son titre, pass6
avec un non propri6taire, l'empichait "A d6faut de la prescription trentenaire, de se rattraper en invoquant l'usucapion";
Attendu qu'en statuant ainsi, la Cour d'appel a viol6 le texte
vis& au moyen:
sans qu'il soit besoin de statuer sur la seconde
branche du moyen et sur les deuxi~me et troisi~me moyens:

PAR CES MOTIFS,

CASSE ET ANNULE L'ARRET rendu entre les parties par la Court
d'appel de Limoges le 16 d6cembre 1963; remet, en consequence, la
cause et les parties au m~me et semblable 6tat oil elles etaient avant
le dit arr~t et pour tre fait droit les renvoie devant la Cour d'appel
de Poitiers;

De la prescription trentenaire
Art. 2262-Toutes les actions, tant r6elles que personnelles, sont
prescrites par trente ans, sans que celui qui all6gue cette prescription soit oblig6 d'en rapporter un titre, ou qu'on puisse lui
opposer l'exception d6duite de la mauvaise foi.
De la prescription par dix et vingt ans.
Art. 2265-Celui qui acquiert de bonne foi et par juste titre un
immeuble, en prescrit la propri&t6 par dix ans, si le v6ritable
propri6taire habite dans le ressort de la Cour dans l'6tendue de
laquelle l'immeuble est situ6; et par vingt ans, s'il est domicili6
hors dudit ressort.
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APPENDIX III

The following course of study was offered at Yale Law
School for the academic year 1981-1982.*
First-Term Required Courses

Units
4

Constitutional Law I
Contracts I

Procedure I
Torts I
Advanced Courses
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE
Fall

Units

Taxation of Income

4

Concept of Corporate
Responsibility
Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions
Corporate Law Workshop
Corporate Reorganization

4

Financial Accounting

3

Intermediaries
Taxation of Foreign
Income and Foreign
Taxpayers

2
3
2

2 or 3
2

Spring

Units

Business Organization and
Activity
Taxation: Corporations
and Shareholders
Taxation of Income

4

Non-Profit Institutions
Regulating Corporate
Behavior
Retirement Plans and
Deferred Compensation
Political Analysis for
Management
Corporate Law Workshop

3

2
4

2 or 3
2

TBA

COMMERCIAL LAW
Fall

Units

Admiralty

2

Secured Transactions

3

Spring

Units

Commercial Law:
Individual Research

TBA

Units

PUBLIC LAW
Fall

Units

Spring

Administrative Process
Civil Rights Seminar

3
2 or 3

Directed Research: Due

2 to 5

Bureaucracy
Common Law Courts in
the Age of Statutes
Directed Research: Due

Process -

The

Constitution of the
Administrative State

Process -

3
3
2 to 5

The

Constitution of the
Administrative State

* The Seton Hall Law Review would like to thank the Registrar's Office of the
Yale Law School for providing the information contained in this appendix.
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Employment
Discrimination

2

Indian Law

2

First Amendment Tradition

3

Labor Law Seminar II:
Selected Problems

2

Law and the Electronic
Media

2

Law and the Political
Process

2

Political and Civil Rights:
Personal Freedoms

3

Law and the Visual Arts

3

Slavery, the Constitution,
and the Supreme Court

2

Political and Civil Rights:
Antidiscrimination Law

4

Antidiscrimination Law:
Research Seminar

2 or 3

Research Seminar: The
Legal Profession
Strategies of Public
Management

3

Units

3

THEORIES OF LAW
Fall

Units

Spring

Jurisprudence

2 or 3

Conflicts of Law

3

Anthropology of Law

3

Constitutional Theory
Seminar

6

Constitutional Theory

3

Sociology of Law:
Introduction

Ethical Theories of
Aristotle and Kant

2

Constitutional Law II

Sentencing Theory and
Sentencing Practice

3

Social Justice

Theories of the Common
Law

2

2 or 3
3

URBAN LAW
Fall

Units

Spring

Land Planning

2 or 3

Property I

4

Units

Occupational Disease

2

Environmental Law:
Theory and Practice

3

Property II

3

Urban Economic
Development Seminar
Environmental Litigation:
Independent Research

2
2

LAW AND MEDICINE
Fall

Units

Spring

Units

Chronically Ill Patient

3

Disclosure and Consent

2 or 3

Dependency and the Law

2

Mental Hospital Legal
Services

3

Health Law and Policy:
Selected Issues

2

Tragic Choices

2 or 3
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COURTS AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Fall

Units

Spring

Evidence
Federal Jurisdiction
Procedure II
Our Federalism
Preventive Detention or
Money Bail?
Role of the Prosecutor in
the Criminal Process
Sentencing Sanctions
Supreme Court
Supreme Court in Action
Trial Practice

3
3
3
2 or 3
3

Complex Civil Litigation
Evidence
Federal Jurisdiction
Civil Legal Assistance
Legal Ethics

Units
3 or 4
3
3
3
2

Legislation

2 or 3

2 or 3
3
3
2

Representing Clients
Sentencing Process

3
3

CRIMINAL LAW: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

Fall
Criminal Law and
Administration I
Criminal Procedure I
Criminal Law and
Procedure: Individual
Research
Criminal Law: Selected
Problems

Units

Spring

3
TBA

Criminal Law and
Administration I
Criminal Procedure II
Federal Criminal Law

3

Prison Legal Services

3

Units
3
2
2

ESTATES AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Fall
Estate Planning
Child Advocacy

Units
2
3

Spring
Estates I
Taxation of Gifts and
Estates

Units
3
2

INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW
Fall
Public Order of the World
Community: A
Contemporary
International Law
Comparative Law
Criminal Responsibility in
International Law

Units

Spring
International Law I

4
3
2

Units
4

International Business
Transactions
International Human
Rights and World Public
Order

LAW AND THE ECONOMY
Fall
Antitrust and the Process
of Change
Economic Aspects of Torts

Units
2 or 3
2

Spring
Antitrust I
Labor Law I

Units
3
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Economic Analysis of Legal
Problems
2 or 3
Elements of Economic
Organizations
2 or more Antitrust II
3

LEGAL HISTORY
Fall
Research Seminar on the
Taft Court

Units
3

Sprg
English Legal History

Units
2

OTHER COURSES
Fall

Units

Sri

Units

Empirical Research
Workshop
National Security Issues:
Communication,
Command Control, and
Intelligence

TBA

Empirical Research
Workshop
Bankruptcy

TBA
4

3
Mass Disasters and their
Procedural
Idiosyncracies
Military Law
National Security and the
Rule of Law
Social Research Methods
for Lawyers
Truth, Justice and the
American Way

2

2
2
1
2

Course Study for the Degree of luris Doctor (.D.)
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
First Term
Each student must take courses in Constitutional Law, Contracts,
Procedure, and Torts. In one of these subjects, the student will be
assigned to a small group of not more than twenty. This small
group is the vehicle for elementary training in legal research and
writing, which is integrated with the regular course work. During
the first term, visits to the New Haven courts are arranged through
the Dean's office.
A series of lectures on the history and organization of the legal
profession, and on problems of legal ethics arising under the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, is offered
during the first term. Attendance at these lectures is required.
Course and Degree Requirements after First Term
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After the first term, students are free to select their own curriculum,
with these exceptions: (a) Criminal Law and Administration I must
be taken before graduation, (b) enrollment in one of several forensic or legal services programs (see p. 22) is required, and (c) six
units of supervised analytic writing (see p. 25) must be completed.
A student must register for no fewer than 12 and no more than 16 units of
work for credit in any term unless approved by the Registrar. To qualify for the J.D. degree, students shall have completed a total of 81
units of satisfactory work, shall have spent at least six full terms of
residence or the equivalent thereof, and shall be recommended for
the degree by the faculty. Under special circumstances, however,
students may obtain permission to complete the requirements in
eight terms.
GRADUATE DEGREES: LL.M. and J.S.D.
The Law School admits a limited number of graduate students each
year to pursue further studies in law. Admission is generally open
only to those committed to teaching as a career and is subject to
approval by the Dean pursuant to policies promulgated by the
faculty of the School and the Corporation of Yale University. Graduate students are admitted for one year's study leading to the degree of LL.M. (Master of Laws).
No uniform course of study is prescribed for LL.M. candidates.
Subject to meeting degree requirements and to the approval of the
Graduate Committee, each LL.M. candidate is invited to utilize the
resources of the School in whatever program of study will best prepare for a career in teaching. An elective program of study will consist of offerings from the J.D. curriculum as well as independent
research for credit under the supervision of a faculty member.
LL.M. candidates must carry a total of not less than 12 units of
credit per term. At least two terms must be spent in residence. To
qualify for the LL.M. degree a candidate must successfully complete
24 units of credit with a grade average of at least Pass, of which up
to six units may (with the consent of the instructor) be taken
credit/fail. Work taken credit/fail must be designated as such on the
records of the Registrar at the time of registration and may not be
so designated subsequent to registration without approval of the
Dean's office.
Each LL.M. candidate, in consultation with a faculty adviser,
will develop a program of study by the start of the academic year.
Changes in that program may be arranged during the first two
weeks of each term.
The J.S.D. (Doctor of the Science of Law) program is normally
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open only to LL.M. graduates of the Yale Law School. An applicant
forJ.S.D. candidacy should submit with the application a satisfactory
proposal for a thesis and any writings that indicate competence in
research. Admission to candidacy will require the contingent approval of a member of the faculty who is willing to supervise the
candidate, and the endorsement of the Graduate Committee.
To qualify for the J.S.D. degree, a candidate once admitted
must submit a thesis which is a substantial contribution to legal
scholarship. At least two terms of work must be spent in residence
at the School - this requirement may be satisfied by residence as an
LL.M. candidate - and at least one additional year, not necessarily
in residence, must be devoted to the preparation and revision of the
thesis. In the case of those whose original legal training was not in
the United States, the Graduate Committee may require the additional year to be in residence.

